
We condemn the brutal assault by members of the Sri Ram Sene on young women in a pub in Mangalore, Karnataka, on Saturday, 24 January 2009. We are shocked by the response of the State administration, police, and political leadership, some of whom have dismissed this as a 'minor incident', while others have blatantly justified the violence. We believe that such threats to the democratic freedom and human rights of citizens, cannot be treated as 'minor'. This incident, and the unabashed justifications of it are part of a larger trend to curb the freedoms of women in the name of a regressive and distorted notion of Indian culture and tradition.
To strongly condemn the disturbing trend of violence against women and 'moral policing' as a means to enforce a particularly regressive interpretation of culture, there will be a protest
R.S.Dahiya
New strains on the balance of payments
C P Chandrasekhar
PROVISIONAL foreign trade figures released this week show that exports during October 2008 at $12.82 billion were 12.1 per cent lower than the level of $14.58 billion in October 2007. This is disconcerting since it comes at a time when reserves have collapsed by almost $80 billion from their peak level of $320 billion. Further, reports suggest that huge borrowing in the past by Indian corporations in the form of bonds convertible to equity are now approaching maturity and would need to be paid back in foreign currency. This is because the conversion prices of at which equity can be bought is much higher than the prevailing stock markets price, in the wake of the stock market meltdown. Thus there would be few takers for conversion and firms would have to buy up dollars to repay their debts. This would draw down reserves even more.
This drop in reserves is disconcerting because it is likely to intensify the sharp depreciation of the Indian rupee from around Rs 44 to the dollar at the beginning of September to close to Rs 50 to the dollar through much of November, which gives cause for concern on many counts. To start with, while it does little to increase India’s exports given similar depreciation in the currencies of India’s competitors, it is bound to increase the foreign exchange outflow on account of imports and worsen the trade balance. Second, by increasing the rupee value of dollar debt service commitments of Indian corporations, which have risen substantially in recent years, it is bound to affect the viability of these firms at a time when demand growth is clearly slowing. Third, increases in the rupee prices of imports of an economy that is more import-dependent after liberalisation would keep rupee inflation up despite lower growth. And finally, sharp and persistent depreciation of this kind creates the possibility of a speculative attack on the rupee that can only make matters worse.
All this makes an analysis of the factors underlying the rupee’s decline imperative. What is clear is that the depreciation of the currency is not the result of any reticence or failure on the part of the Reserve Bank of India to intervene in the market to stabilise the rupee. As its Mid-Term Review of Macroeconomic and Monetary Developments declared, among the measures adopted in the wake of the global financial crisis was the decision that the Reserve Bank “would continue to sell foreign exchange (US dollar) through agent banks or directly to augment supply in the domestic foreign exchange market or intervene directly to meet any demand-supply gaps.” That this decision was implemented emerges from the facts that while as recently as April the RBI was purchasing large quantities of dollars and adding them to its reserves, its net sales of the dollar between June and September was as much as $14.1 billion. Indications are that sales have been as high or even higher in the two months since then.
In fact, ever since the week ending October 3, in most weeks the foreign exchange assets held by the Reserve Bank of India have declined rather sharply, indicating that the central bank has been accommodating demands for foreign exchange at the expense of reserves. Overall, the decline in reserves between the end of March 2008 and November 7, 2008 has been $58.4 billion, which is a substantial proportion of the $310-plus billion India had when reserves were at their peak. What therefore seems to be creating the uncertainty that leads to rupee depreciation is not the non-availability of the dollar, but evidence that normal foreign exchange inflows are far short of the requirements needed to finance outflows, leading to a sharp fall in reserves.
One factor responsible for the excess of outflows over inflows is of course the exodus of foreign institutional investors. But this does not seem to be the whole explanation. Total outflows from equity investments by FIIs between April and November 2008, which is seen as underlying the stock market collapse, amounted to $10.7 billion, or less than a fifth of the decline in reserves during this period.
This leaves outflows on account of trade related payments, which would indeed have gone up because the sharp increase in the price of oil. The average price of India’s crude import basket touched $142 a barrel on July 3, 2008. Over the period April-August, 2008 the average price of the basket stood at US $ 120.4 per barrel (having ranged between US $ 105.8 – 132.2 per barrel). This was 76.6 per cent higher than the US $ 68.2 per barrel recorded during April-August, 2007.
This does seem to have affected India’s trade deficit over the April-August 2008 period, when it stood at $49.3 billion, as compared with $34.6 billion during the corresponding period of the previous year. This widening of the deficit was on account of the oil trade deficit which rose from $12.3 to $20.5 billion, whereas the non-oil deficit actually shrank from $13.5 billion to $9 billion.
It must be noted, however, that the merchandise trade deficit does not does not really capture the excess demand for foreign currency emanating from the current account, because of the importance of invisible inflows in the form of remittances and software and IT-enabled export revenues in India’s balance of payments. Quarterly balance of payments figures, which are thus far available only for the April-June 2008 period, show that while the merchandise trade deficit increased by close to $11 billion between April-June 2007 and April-June 2008, the current account deficit rose by only around $4.5 billion, because of the benefit of increased net invisible incomes.
Moreover, the drain of foreign exchange reserves during the period when the rupee was depreciating would have been far less affected by the merchandise trade deficit because of the sharp decline in oil prices. By September 10, the average price of Indian crude imports had fallen below the $100-a-barrel level, and this figure fell below $44 a barrel by November 24. This would have moderated the trade deficit, making the current account deficit much less of a factor generating an excess demand for dollars and applying downward pressure on the rupee.
In the circumstances, the drain of reserves and the depreciation of the rupee appear to be the result of one of two factors or a combination of both. The first is a possible sharp fall in inflows of capital other than foreign institutional equity investment into the economy. The balance of payments data referred to above, point to a decline in aggregate (direct and portfolio) foreign investment from $10.1 billion during April-June 2007 to $5.9 billion during April-June 2008, and a decline in foreign debt flowing into the country from $7 billion to $1.6 billion across these two periods. Given the fall out of the financial crisis, there is sufficient reason to believe that this tendency would have not just continued but intensified in the period after June 2008. If this shortfall in capital inflows accounts for the excess demand for foreign exchange, it implies that the weakness of India’s balance of payments and of the Indian rupee stem from their fact that their earlier “strength” was not earned, but merely the result of a capital surge into the country. With that surge having reversed itself the drain of reserves and the depreciation of the currency seems to have followed.
A second factor accounting for the sharp depreciation of the rupee could be speculative activity in the foreign exchange market based on expectations that the currency’s decline is inevitable. But in a liberalised foreign exchange market such speculation is bound to occur, especially when indications are that India’s balance of payments strengths were ephemeral and were being quickly reversed. In the event, even large reserves, which are still substantial and adequate to finance more than a year’s worth of imports seem insufficient to stall the rupee’s fall.
Terrorism & National Security
Learning From The Mumbai Assault
Raghu
IN the aftermath of the horrific terrorist attack in Mumbai, it is only to be expected that a raging debate has erupted about national security and possible lapses. However, little light has been shed on systemic changes that are clearly required.
Much of the debate has been poorly informed and, especially on TV, often clouded by emotional responses. Unfounded rumours, unverified gossip or inspired leaks from different arms of government seeking to blame each other have not helped. Some of the desire for punitive action against the perpetrators and their sponsors may be understandable, but such attitudes are not conducive to the desired goal, namely a thoroughgoing reform of the security apparatus to prevent further such disasters.
This article is not a post mortem of the Mumbai attack but seeks to draw lessons from it and from comparable international experience. Viewing national security as part of overall security strategy, one should examine the architecture and workings of anti-terrorist security in all its dimensions i.e. detection or intelligence gathering and analysis, prevention or pre-emption, preparedness and capacity-building, and finally disruption or response.
Intelligence
The first and most obvious question for discussion is whether the attack on Mumbai could have been prevented. The only however unsatisfactory answer can only be --- probably. Even US intelligence agencies admit that, with all the measures they have instituted, a sea-borne attack on the US as in Mumbai could happen! A good thief will always find a way to beat the best lock! The goal of all security systems is therefore, not to provide a foolproof guarantee, but to make the task of the terrorist as difficult as possible, be flexible and facilitate prevention.
Contrary to accusations of “intelligence failure”, it now appears that credible intelligence had been generated about a possible sea-borne terrorist attack on Mumbai. Intercepts of communications over satellite and mobile phones spanning a considerable period were available from Indian as well as US agencies. Two major questions arise: was the information sufficient to enable preventive actions and how was the information disseminated and used?
Media leaks from India’s external intelligence agency, RAW, speak of several pointed recent alerts, even suggestions that the famous hotels by the sea were targets. The Mumbai police chief denies having received any “specific” information but says that rather vague messages were received about attacks likely from the sea somewhere on the West Coast. Navy chief Admiral Suresh Mehta states that “no actionable intelligence was provided.” Yet there is tacit admission by both that, due to this same intelligence, police forces in Mumbai as well as the Navy and Coast Guard had indeed been on alert. So much so that a Coast Guard vessel had in fact intercepted the allegedly hijacked trawler but let it go when the occupants showed some possibly fake identification.
How much more “actionable” can intelligence get? Will security agencies wait to act until they are provided the exact time and location of attack so that terrorists simply walk into the waiting arms of law enforcement?
There may well have been a problem in information transmission. If all sorts of information flow in an unsorted and non-prioritised fashion, they cease to be useful. One can well imagine bureaucrats in the security forces receiving several intelligence memos from different sources each day and simply marking them up the ladder or filing them away!
Vetting and analysis of intelligence, building upon leads to gather more related information to bring out a clearer picture (or development as it is called in the parlance), assigning appropriate threat levels, effective communication to all concerned and ensuring appropriate follow-up measures, are all important elements in the chain. Clearly all this was not done in the present instance. As it now transpires, even the prime minister’s security was not aware of the alert when they went to the Oberoi Hotel in Mumbai just a few hours before the attack to prepare for the PM’s visit a few days hence!
Admiral Mehta argues that all this represents “system failure”.
Flawed system, not system failure
This has become a much-abused term in India. By seemingly acknowledging that the whole system is faulty, it prevents closer examination of problem areas. More importantly, the term suggests a well-designed functioning system exists which somehow broke down on the day. Trouble is, the security system in India has for long been deeply and structurally flawed and, over the years regardless of the party in power, has only been tinkered with at the margins.
Sure, intelligence gathering capability could be further improved but in Mumbai, the problem was how intelligence was communicated, in what form and to whom, and what action was proposed or taken in response. Was there a system at all?
The BJP which led the central government during 1996-2004, and which is now attacking the UPA government for its failures, also invoked “system failure” after the Kargil fiasco but did precious little to rectify basic problems. Then too, as the K Subrahmanyam Kargil Review Committee concluded, prior intelligence had been ignored and the Army was finally compelled to respond in fire-fighting fashion. The Report on National Security prepared as a follow-up by a Group of Ministers (GoM) headed by L K Advani himself made many recommendations, most of which were not implemented certainly in spirit, and were also not followed up to ensure proper functioning towards the desired ends.
The GoM Report had recommended an agency to co-ordinate all intelligence: the Joint Intelligence Committee under the National Security Council was set up, but does it function as intended? What happened to the intelligence alert and how was it processed? The Navy chief told TV channels that he had seen media reports that the Coast Guard had intercepted and cleared the hijacked vessel --- note he had not heard this directly from the Coast Guard! Many coastal police stations as recommended have been set up both during the NDA and UPA tenures, including 24 in Maharashtra alone, but they are notoriously poorly equipped in terms of boats, weaponry and trained personnel. Were they alerted and activated to act on the Mumbai intelligence alerts? Should there not have been a more active cordon-and-search by the Coast Guard in view of the alert? Should coastal police stations in and near Mumbai not have noticed the terrorists landing with laden haversacks?
In a typically verbose article on CNN-IBN’s website, Arun Shourie of the BJP blames the UPA for failing to act on repeated warnings over many years that the sea-route was vulnerable. Referring to the 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai when RDX was smuggled in by sea, he asks “were those blasts not warning enough?” Indeed, but what did the BJP/NDA government do when they were in power for 8 long years till 2004? And did any other measures taken prevent the assault on parliament or on the Akshardham temple, or the hijack to Kandahar of Indian Airlines IC-817 plane which took off from Amritsar even as the NSG was getting ready?
The GoM Report had called for “dispersal of the NSG units at strategic parts across the country”, a step not taken by the NDA then or by the UPA till now after the Mumbai assault. It had recommended that “NSG should not be deployed for duties… beyond its original mandate”, in other words for VIP duties, an injunction completely ignored by both NDA and UPA. It bemoaned the “lack of institutionalised arrangements for sharing and co-ordination of intelligence at various levels and particularly at the field level”, and had also called for an “an apex body for management of maritime affairs… for institutionalised linkages between the Navy, Coast Guard and the concerned ministries of the central and state governments”. And the failure is not political alone but bureaucratic as well, both civilian and military, as the obstruction to the appointment of a chief of defence staff by the different Services shows.
Overhaul needed
Whatever the posturing today, neither the NDA nor the UPA have followed through on these. Indeed, the reality is that the entire political and bureaucratic establishment, including the strategic community, the security services and the armed forces, has failed in this regard.
Useful lessons are available from experiences of other countries. In the US, the review of the horrendous “9/11” terrorist attacks showed that intelligence about suspicious persons taking flying lessons in the US and conspiracies being hatched to attack the US simply formed part of the information “noise” and did not receive due attention. The US inquiry found that different agencies were pursuing their own paths and collation systems were not working. The US therefore created a new Office of the Director of National Intelligence sitting on top of the CIA and other agencies, and tasked with co-ordinating all intelligence and working closely with a newly formed Department of Homeland Security which in turn co-ordinates the work of and liaises with all security and police departments nationwide. By all accounts, these new systems are working well, even discounting the intrusive and extra-constitutional domestic surveillance measures initiated by the Bush administration.
In the UK, the security system was restructured after 9/11 and revamped again after the attack on the London Underground in 2005. The Anti-Terror Branch set up earlier and the Special Branch of the London Metropolitan Police were brought together into a “single counter-terrorism command not restricted… by existing structures, with a better capability and capacity to meet ongoing and future threats” and “bringing together intelligence analysis and development with investigations and operational support activity” and inter-meshing with both local police and national security structures.
In India, in response to criticism that the NSG commandos reached Mumbai only after several hours, the government has announced that four decentralised NSG hubs will be set up each with their own, independent aircraft. More such piecemeal steps would undoubtedly be unveiled over the coming weeks. But what is needed is not improvements here and there but a complete overhaul of the architecture and in the way things are done.
Two important aspects may be highlighted here, other than those already discussed.
The adoption and deployment of technologies for surveillance and detection is being rightly stressed but it is equally important to see that these are effectively used. CCTV systems should be backed by real-time monitoring so they can have a preventive role rather passively recording information for post-incident evidence. The need for X-ray and more sophisticated odour-detection or other systems for screening of luggage and people even in “open” public transport systems and other public places, not just in closed spaces such as airports, has not been given due attention rendering such spaces particularly vulnerable. Costs are no doubt a factor but resources need to be optimally deployed so that the maximum numbers of citizens, especially common folk, are protected. Luxury hotels and airports will readily get better protected but what about railway stations, bus stands, market places? The budget of the PM’s Special Protection Group currently exceeds that of the NSG mandated for the whole nation’s security!
The weakest link in the entire system, namely the local police forces, needs to be urgently addressed. These are not only a vital element in the system of intelligence gathering and surveillance but are also first responders if and when all defences are breached. The NSG or SPG “black cats” may have good weaponry and communications equipment, but surely the sight of policemen at Mumbai’s Shivaji Railway Terminal cowering behind pillars unable to counter the terrorists’ automatic weapons with their own single-loading rifles must prompt urgent action nationwide. And weaponry is just a small part of the total picture: local police also require comprehensive re-training, a redefining of their roles, a revival of the beat system with active community linkages. Modernisation of ill-equipped, poorly trained and under-motivated police forces in India is long overdue, especially in view of the threats posed not only by terrorists but also by insurgents of various hues. It is necessary, but not enough, to simply recruit more police. And impoverished state governments should not be left to carry the financial burden involved. Time will tell if the home minister Chidambaram will act differently from finance minister Chidambaram in this regard!
Looking forward
A restructuring of the security architecture must be accompanied by measures to involve the people and to bring about changes in the security environment and related behaviour of corporations, commercial establishments, shopkeepers and local markets, property owners and so on. Security standards need to be established and compliance ensured, but this is another area where India is historically poor, as recent evidence shows on failure by Telecom companies to obtain verification of mobile phone user identities. TV anchors are now lambasting “politicians” as a class for all evils, but the rot goes far deeper. The great Ratan Tata himself, head of the Taj Group of luxury hotels, said in a TV interview to CNN that better security measures at his hotel in Mumbai would not have worked since all these were at the front entrance while the terrorists came in from the unguarded rear! No anchor questioned this or the astonishing view that “hospitality and security do not go together”: indeed they must! The same anchors were earlier pushing the government, and egging on the public, to demand the release of Masood Azhar in exchange for the hostages of the hijacked aircraft held in Kandahar and, more recently, to pay ransom if need be to free the pirate-captured Indian crew of the Stolt Valor.
It needs constant reiteration that national security is strategic in nature, it is long-term and embraces both foreign and domestic policies. All those clamouring for “action against Pakistan” should realise that, quite apart from the obvious human and other costs that any military engagement with the world’s 9th largest army armed with nuclear weapons would entail, such action may only trigger even more enmity in the future. Any steps taken should be part of a longer-term strategy, meaning measures designed to achieve desired goals.
The Indian people, media and those gathered in various protest demonstrations should realise who to blame and who the enemy is: the terrorists! Their objective is to turn our people against each other, against our government and against our neighbours. These are the biggest dangers to be thwarted.
Five common shortcomings of health-care delivery system
1..Inverse care:
People with the most means – whose needs for health care are often less – consume the most care, whereas those with the least means and greatest health problems consume the least. Public spending on health services most often benefits the rich more than the poor in high- and low income countries alike.
2..Impoverishing care.
Wherever people lack social protection and payment for care is largely out-of-pocket at the point of service, they can be confronted with catastrophic expenses. Over 100 million people annually fall into poverty because they have to pay for health care.
3..Fragmented and fragmenting care.
The excessive specialization of health-care providers and the narrow focus of many disease control programmes discourage a holistic approach to the individuals and the families they deal with and do not appreciate the need for continuity in care. Health services for poor and marginalized groups are often highly fragmented and severely under-resourced, while development aid often adds to the fragmentation
4..Unsafe care.
Poor system design that is unable to ensure safety and hygiene standards leads to high rates of hospital-acquired infections, along with medication errors and other avoidable adverse effects that are an underestimated cause of death and ill-health.
5..Mis directed care.
Resource allocation clusters around curative services at great cost, neglecting the potential of primary prevention and health promotion to prevent up to 70% of the disease burden. At the same time, the health sector lacks the expertise to mitigate the adverse effects on health from other sectors and make the most of what these other sectors can contribute to health.
Harsev Bains
There is an old saying that when the
Businesses ranging from a one man operated small business to those employing thousands of workers are closing at the unprecedented rate of 43 per day and this is projected to increase to 140 closures per day. Official unemployment figures of 1.8 million people (already above 2 million in real terms) are expected to rise to 3 million people next year. Every day there are further announcements of thousands more job losses and more working people join the ranks of the unemployed.
Homelessness is on the increase with over 45,000 homes expected to be repossessed by the banks in this year alone.
The crisis of capitalism as detailed in the articles and features in People’s Democracy during the last year is real and present.
Britain prides itself as having a special close relationship with the USA and aligns its foreign and domestic economic policies to reflect the ups, downs and mood swings of America. During the years of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the USA in the 1980’s the manufacturing base of Britain was systematically and irreparably destroyed and has served to curb the power of Trade Unions and reign in the strength of the working class.
Britain of the noughties now has an economy heavily reliant on the financial services and house building sectors. It is ill prepared to meet the challenges of either of these two pillars of its ballooned economy. Britain now has the largest deficit of the developed world and largest personal debt amongst the western industrial nations. The deficit is projected to grow from the present 38 per cent to 57 per cent of GDP by the year 2011. This will create a staggering deficit of £500 billion from government figures and closer to £1 trillion according to the opposition parties.
In the summer of 2007, reckless 'sub-prime' mortgage lending to low-income (and indeed no-income) Americans began a ripple of financial problems around the world. It has made banks less willing to lend to each other and to consumers. That is the “credit crunch”. This descended into a full-blown economic crisis in October 2008 following which a rash of bank failures and nationalisations have swept around the world.
Meanwhile, consumers have also had to deal with price rises. Commodity prices rose sharply in 2007 and during the first six months of 2008, driven by demand from the booming economies of India and China making petrol, food and other basic costs significantly more expensive. This surging inflation had prevented central banks from cutting interest rates to help ease the credit crunch.
Other global factors included the curse of derivatives. The financial innovation of capital called the Credit Default Swap System (CDSS), is being described as the monster of the deep that has endangered capitalism. In basic terms it is a simple idea on how to make money by trading in expectations. It allows an investor to buy insurance against a company defaulting on its debt payments. A little like an insurance company selling you car insurance speculating on the risk of you crashing / not crashing your car.
At first it was a useful concept, as people in the finance sector felt comfortable owning corporate debt if they could eliminate the risk of the debtor failing. The extra appetite and availability of debt helped to lower the cost of capital and inflated the economy.
Sellers of insurance base their views on risk on past experience, but CDSS, being a relatively modern concept meant that insurers relied on the insatiable greed of the speculators. Indeed, such greed to the point that if Lehman and AIG had gone bust the whole share market system would have collapsed.
In Britain, the first to fail was the bank Northern Rock, one of the largest housing market lenders, followed by Bradford and Bingley, HBOS, Lloyds and RBS. The British government nationalised the first two banks and injected £60 billion, with an additional safety net of £400 billion into the finance sector buying up to 60 per cent of the equity of RBS.
With decreasing inflation the Bank of England, the regulating body for monetary policy, lowered the base rate of interest, from 4.5 per cent to 3 per cent. There is now widespread speculation that the Bank of England will have to lower the rate further still to 1.5 per cent, being below the all time low of 2 per cent in 1951. Retailers are competing to sell their produce at heavily discounted prices to stay in business and with a declining economy; there is now a real fear of deflation creating the black hole in the capitalist economic system.
The presidential elections in the USA beamed and followed across the globe, displayed to the world the downturn of the US economy and the crisis of capitalism. The realisation of these extraordinary events and the extraordinary response by the USA and western governments was and is unprecedented.
The bail outs started with Bear Stearns in March and the financial giants Fannie May, Freddie Mac and AIG. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the $700 billion US bank bail out was unthinkable.
The members of the G8 followed suit to reverse the collapse in the financial markets and committed more than US$3 trillion without much success. The size of the global crisis has now reached such a magnitude that economists in the USA have to add more zeroes to describe this scale beyond the trillions.
The banking giant Citigroup is the most recent bank being bailed out by the US government with an injection of US$20 billion, as it faced collapse under a wave of sub-prime losses of £13.3billion. The bank employs 300,000 people worldwide with more than 12,000 employed in Britain.
The combined effects of the credit crunch, rising unemployment and poverty is giving way to shrinking economies.
The American automobile manufacturers General Motors, Chrysler and Ford are on the verge of collapse with the potential to lay off 3 million workers world wide. Manufacturers of cars in Britain including Honda have already announced the lay off of 21,000 of their workforce within the next three months.
The Tata Group, the manufacturer of Jaguar cars which employs 15,000 people, has held secret talks with the government to plead for a £1billion loan. Its appeal for a taxpayer bailout comes nine months after the Indian conglomerate bought the famous marques from Ford for £1.3billion. That deal was financed by a £2billion bridging loan from banks, which also provided funding to keep the business running. Tata, which also owns Tetley Tea and the former British Steel group Corus, now wants the
A repercussion of this crisis could have grave implications for the migrant population including the 1.5 million people of Indian origin living in
It is acutely important for established organisations such as the Indian Workers’ Association to ally itself with the trade unions and other working class organisations, to defend the people and withstand the challenges of the recession.
US President-elect Barack Obama has promised to invest in infrastructure on a scale not seen since the 1950s, when the US highway system was established.
He used his weekly address to outline that the spending would be part of his plan to create at least 2.5m new jobs in the ailing US economy.
He also spoke of the need for expanded access to high-speed internet and the modernisation of school buildings.
Unemployment rose by more than 500,000 during November, figures have shown.
That was the biggest monthly rise in job cuts since 1974, and it drove up the jobless rate to a 15-year high of 6.7%, up from 6.5% in October.
The figures came less than a week after the National Bureau for Economic Research said the US economy had been in recession since late 2007.
Mr Obama, who takes office on 20 January, has previously said that his incoming team will be tasked with generating 2.5m new jobs by 2011.
Broadband drive
On Saturday, speaking in his weekly address, Mr Obama outlined how most of that employment might be created.
"We'll invest your precious tax dollars in new and smarter ways, and we'll set a simple rule - use it or lose it. If a state doesn't act quickly to invest in roads and bridges in their communities, they'll lose the money."
The president-elect said that broadband internet connections in the US should be available to schoolchildren and hospitals.
"In the country that invented the internet, every child should have the chance to get online and... that's how we'll strengthen America's competitiveness in the world," he said.
School buildings, he continued, would be modernised and upgraded to make them energy-efficient.
The new administration, he added, would launch a massive effort to make public buildings more energy-efficient by replacing old heating systems and installing efficient light bulbs.
"Our government now pays the highest energy bill in the world - we need to change that," he said.
Interview With Hemant Karkare
By Rana Ayyub
29 November, 2008
Tehelka
ATS chief Hemant Karkare told RANA AYYUB, shortly before his death in the Mumbai terror attacks, that more army officers will not be arrested
The 2008 Malegaon blasts investigations have, for the first time, linked the right wing organisations to terrorist acts in the country. ATS Joint commissioner Hemant Karkare was spearheading the investigation. In an interview with TEHELKA, he had clarified the ATS stand on the conflicting reports that have been trickling out regarding the investigations.
Reports suggest that VHP strongman Pravin Togadia funded Abhinav Bharat, the organisation which is allegedly involved in the Malegaon blasts? Has this been confirmed?
There was a reference to his name during the investigation, but that has nothing to do with the Malegaon blasts investigations of 2008. At this point of time, we are only looking into the 2008 blasts.
Will Pravin Togadia be questioned, since his name has also cropped up in the narco tests done on the accused in the Nanded blasts of 2006?
No, as of now there is no evidence against him. As I said earlier, we are looking at only the Malegaon blasts, so there is no question of interrogating Pravin Togadia.
Reports suggest the involvement of high-profile seers in the Malegaon blasts. Has the ATS got proof of this?
We are not looking at seers or saints in relation to the Malegaon blasts. We are not looking at people from a particular community when we question them. We are just detaining people on the basis of evidence. As for Dayanand Pandey, he has proclaimed himself to be a seer. There are a lot of people going around claiming to be saints.
Was Swami Aseemanand from Dangs involved in other blasts, including the one at Ajmer, as reports suggest?
A reference has been made to his name during the investigations, we cannot divulge much at this stage. These people might not have been seers. Aseemanand could also have taken the garb of a seer.
While presenting its case, the ATS said that there was a possibility of those arrested in the Malegaon blasts case also being involved in the blasts that took place in the Marathwada region in 2006. Is there evidence to prove this? Has the ATS been able to link those arrested to other blasts?
There are agencies that have been looking at the various links, namely the CBI, which has been looking at the Malegaon blasts of 2006. The link we found is that of Rakesh Dhawre. He is a Pune-based counterfeit arms dealer who was involved in the training that took place for the blasts of 2006. He is the common link between the 2006 blasts including the ones in Purna and Parbhani, and the 2008 Malegaon blasts. Investigating agencies are working on it.
There are reports that police officials from other states have been coming to interrogate those arrested by the ATS. Is that true?
Yes, police officials from other states have been coming but that’s something which is protocol in such cases. They wanted to know of the modus operandi so that they could figure out if there are similarities to other blasts, in Andhra Pradesh and Chandigarh. What they found out is something only they will be able to tell you.
The ATS made a flip-flop on the links of those arrested with the Samjhauta blasts, which raised questions when it found no mention in the remand copy.
A lot has been made of the Samjhauta Express statement that was made by the public prosecutor in the case. There was a statement made by the witness that Purohit helped in the procurement of RDX. That was a part of the case diary. It cannot be taken as gospel truth. What was wrong was the mention of the same to the media, although we had said that there is no such evidence of the same.
The BJP has targeted the ATS for its investigations. Has there been any political pressure?
We are here to do our job as an investigating agency and bring out the truth. Having said that, it’s baseless to say that we are working under political pressure. There is absolutely no pressure on me or my officials. We are doing our best to bring the truth out.
Abhinav Bharat has come out as having played a key role. Is the ATS planning to question Himani Savarkar, its founder member?
We look at individuals and not organisations when we carry out our investigations. We are not looking at Abhinav Bharat, we are looking at the individuals involved. We have not questioned Himani Savarkar so far, and as yet, there is no evidence against her.
There are reports that an ATS team has left for Delhi. Is it true?
No, it’s absolutely untrue.
There were also reports that the army was not cooperating with the ATS with regards to information on Col Purohit and his leave records?
I would like to clear this. The army has given cooperation to the ATS right from day one on every aspect of the interrogation. There have been reports that the army has not been cooperating with the ATS and that’s absolutely untrue. The army gave us his leave records and other documents, which we needed.
Is the ATS looking at arresting more army officials?
No, we are not looking at arresting or detaining any more army officials in the case.
Most of the accused have alleged that they have been subjected to physical and mental torture.
We are doing our duty as investigating agencies. Such allegations come during the course of investigations. But they are untrue. We cannot do anything about such allegations
Can Purohit and Dayanand Pandey be called the key conspirators in the Malegaon blasts? Is this evident from the narco tests of the accused?
We are yet to get the narco reports. There is evidence against Purohit, but we can’t reveal anything at this stage
As the findings of narco tests are not admissible in court, does the ATS have substantial proof to nail the accused in the case?
The ATS has been carrying out investigations. We have enough evidence against the people we have arrested and we will present it in court.
There has been a report that Purohit and Dayanand Pandey had conspired to kill RSS veterans like Mohan Bhagwat and Indreesh. What do you have to say on this? Have those arrested confessed to the same? The name of Delhi-based doctor RP Singh too has cropped up during the course of investigations. Does the ATS have evidence suggesting his involvement?
The name of RP Singh came up during the investigation of Dayanand Pandey. I can’t reveal much about it at this stage. As for the assassination of RSS leaders, some references had emerged but they can’t be linked to any organisation.
Are more arrests likely to be made by the ATS in the Malegaon blasts? Do you also see the involvement of Hindu organisations like the Bajrang Dal, RSS, and Sanatan Sanstha in various terror acts in the country?
The ATS had filed a chargesheet against the Sanatan Sanstha in a different case, but there is no proof to link organisations as yet with the blasts. We are just looking at individuals.
Does the arrest of seers and armymen in terror acts suggest a trend?
Col Purohit was just an aberration. Just because one man has been arrested it does not mean that the entire army is tainted. Tomorrow, you cannot blame the entire police force just because one officer is arrested.
Have some other names cropped up during the investigations of the accused?Has the name of Nitin Joshi, one of the key members of the Abhinav Bharat, cropped up?
At the moment we are looking for Shyam Apte and Ramji, who have been named in the investigations. They played an important role and are absconding.
rana@tehelka.com
From Tehelka Magazine, Vol 5, Issue 48, Dated Dec 06, 2008
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